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If "The Devil Himself Knows Not the
Mind of Man," How Possibly Can
Judges Know the Motivation of
Legislators?
ARTHUR S. MILLER*
Well over a century ago, Chief Justice Chase in a well-known
opinion flatly stated: "We are not at liberty to inquire into the mo-
tives of the legislature. We can only examine into its power under
the Constitution .... 1 A half-century later, another Chief Jus-
tice, William Howard Taft, maintained in the Child Labor Tax
Case that the federal child labor tax had a "palpable," "prohibi-
tory and regulatory effect." 2 Chief Justice Taft continued, some-
what plaintively: "All others can see and understand this. How
can we properly shut our minds to it?"3 Numerous other exam-
ples exist in United States Supreme Court reports, but these two
statements pose as well as any the polar opposites in the question
whether it is appropriate for the Court to inquire into the legisla-
ture's motives.
In my brief commentary on the two major papers in this Collo-
quium, 4 1 should like to take as my text neither something either
author has written nor, indeed, anything written by the other
* Professor of Law, The George Washington University. BA, Willamette Uni-
versity, 1938; LL.B., Stanford University, 1949; J.S.D., Yale Law School, 1959.
1. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1869).
2. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 37 (1922).
3. Id. This might be called the "Little Abner" rule: As Al Capp's character
often said, "[A] ny fool kin plainly see ...... I take it Chief Justice Taft was saying
that judges should be able to see what any fool can see; but judges see only if they
wish to see, and only then, as this commentary suggests.
4. Clark, Legislative Motivation and Fundamental Rights in Constitutional
Law, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 953 (1978); Simon, Racially Prejudiced Governmental
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principal contributors to the literature on legislative motivation in
constitutional adjudication.5 Rather, I should like to base my com-
ments on a statement published a few years ago by Judge J.
Braxton Craven, Jr., of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit. Said he in a little noted but important essay: "I believe that
there are only two kinds of judges at all levels of courts: those
who are admittedly (maybe not to the public) result-oriented, and
those who are also result-oriented but either do not know it or de-
cline for various purposes to admit it."6 Both major papers here,
as well as the contributions of others who have weighed in on the
question, are substantial contributions-but of a certain genre.
With the greatest deference to each of the authors, whose indus-
try and attention to detail one must surely applaud, I find the
studies to be too long and too detailed, and with far too many
footnotes. In making this statement, I realize of course that I am
running against the tide of scholarship in the law journals. Profes-
sor Clark's article, for example, runs some eighty-seven pages, the
reading of which surely must qualify as cruel and unusual pun-
ishment for the professoriate. A judge might cite, but certainly
will not read, such extensive disquisitions on what essentially is a
fairly simple matter. Perhaps his law clerk will read it, particu-
larly if it comes from an educator or lawyer with whom he is ac-
quainted.
An old saying in the legal profession suggests that if one has
enough time, he can write a brief or any other document con-
cisely. When a writer is hurried, under pressure of deadlines, he
tends to wax prolix. Judges do not care for long briefs, by the
way, if one can infer a general rule from the Supreme Court's re-
fusal to accept a more than one hundred-page brief a few years
ago.
What, then, is the problem regarding motivation? At the risk of
being called simplistic, let me suggest that Professor Robert
Cushman put his finger on the essence of the question when in
1934 he saic
The criterion of 'objective constitutionality,' which may not inaccurately
be called the doctrine of judicial obtuseness,' permits the Court to uphold
any carefully drawn taxing statute designed to promote the social and eco-
Actions: A ,Motivation Theory of the Constitutional Ban Against Racial
Discrimination, 15 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 1041 (1978).
5. .The principal commentators on legislative motivation are Professors Brest,
Eisenberg, and Ely. See Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem
of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. REV. 95; Eisenberg, Dispro-
portionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52
N.Y.U. L. REV. 36 (1977); Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Consti-
tutional Law, 79 YALE.LJ. 1205 (1970).
6. Craven, Paean to Pragmatism, 50 N.C. L REV. 977, 977 (1972).
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nomic well-being of the country through regulation or repression by the
simple process of keeping the judicial eye discreetly on the portions of the
act which spell 'tax' and discreetly off those which spell 'regulation and
destruction.'7
Professor Cushman was speaking of Congress using the power to
tax as a basis for a "national police power," but his views surely
have a wider relevance. What follows are a few of his considera-
tions that seem pertinent to this Colloquium.
If Judge Craven is correct, as I think he is, then judges can and
do attempt to evaluate the consequences of alternative deci-
sions-the consequences, that is, on the social order of deciding
one way or another. That judges are not very expert at this needs
no present restatement; lawyers, too, have little or no expertise in
the area. Indeed, the adversary system itself does not, in its pres-
ent form (even with Brandeis briefs), provide data sufficiently
relevant and accurate to permit judges to make such evaluations.8
Justice Frankfurter admitted as much a few years ago when in
the course of an off-bench speech he candidly acknowledged that
he had no idea of the economic impact of Supreme Court anti-
trust decisions. 9
Nonetheless, as any student of the judiciary knows (or should
know), judges routinely make assertions concerning the societal
impact of given decisions. Usually these assertions are in dissent-
ing opinions. Examples are legion and need not be multiplied.
Consider, for example, Justice Harlan's assertion in Wesberry v.
Sanders that the majority's decision "saps the political proc-
ess,"0 and Justice McReynolds' choleric attack in Norman v. Bal-
timore & Ohio Railroad (the gold clause case)-that "chaos"
would surely ensue."
What do these assertions mean? The answer is simple: Motiva-
tion must be married to impact analysis. Furthermore, motivation
must be connected with an ability of judges and lawyers to pre-
dict with reasonable certainty what Justice Frankfurter called
"the practical consequences" of judicial decisions: The "blind
7. Cushman, Social and Economic Control Through Federal Taxation, 18
Tfn-N. L. REV. 759, 782 (1934).
8. See Miller & Barron, The Supreme Court the Adversary System, and the
Flow of Information to the Justices: A Preliminary Inquiry, 61 VA. L REV. 1187
(1975).
9. F. FhANxFuRTER, SoE OBSERVATIONS ON SUPREME COURT L-rIGATION AND
LEGAL EDUCATION 17 (1954).
10. 376 U.S. 1, 48 (1964) (Harlan, 3., dissenting).
11. 294 U.S. 240, 381 (1935) (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
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guesses" of the judiciary are not sufficient to the need.12
An inquiry inta motivation unavoidably means an expanded
role for the judiciary. If one follows the views of Chief Justice
Chase'3-shared, by the way, by that best-known exponent of ju-
dicial self-restraint, Oliver Wendell Holmes' 4 --then it is clear be-
yond doubt that the judges will have a limited role. Motivation, in
other words, is an invitation, open-ended to be sure, for judges to
act as "an imperial judiciary." 5
Motivation inquiry is analogous to a search for legislative inten-
tion, or in constitutional terms, a search for the intentions of the
Founding Fathers. As such, it is surely a bootless quest. Anyone
with even a passing knowledge of how legislatures operate knows
that on many statutes an individual member simply has no intent.
At times, furthermore, he does not have more than the sketchiest
knowledge about the details of a bill.
The same is true for the propensity of repairing to the Founding
Fathers for guidance on present-day constitutional matters. Cer-
tainly the fifty-five men who sat in Philadelphia in 1787, the
thirty-nine men who signed the document, or the members of the
state legislatures that ratified it cannot be said to have had a spe-
cific intention on any modern question. Is it not time, then, that
judges and lawyers recognize that the Founding Fathers have
been buried and that they should not and cannot rule us from
their graves? The answer can be only "yes." In making this state-
ment, I am quite aware of such books as the remarkably silly dis-
quisition by Raoul Berger, entitled Government by Judiciary: The
Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment.'6 Berger believes
that the fourteenth amendment should be construed only in the
light of what the members of the Thirty-ninth Congress, which
first passed it, intended. Under no circumstances should such a
view be followed by any thoughtful student of the judiciary or, in-
deed, of the Constitution.
12. F. FRANEURTER, SOME OBSERVATIONS ON SUPREME COURT LITIGATION AND
LEGAL EDUCATION 17 (1954).
13. See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
14. Said Justice Holmes: "About seventy-five years ago I learned that I was not
God. And so, when the people... want to do something I can't find anything in
the Constitution expressly forbidding them to do, I say, whether I like it or not,
'Goddammit, let 'em do it!"' C. CURTIS, LIONS UNDER THE THRONE 281 (1947).
15. The notion of "an imperial judiciary" has been proffered in Glazer, Towards
an Imperial Judiciary?, 41 PUB. INTEREST 104 (1975),criticized in Miller, Judicial
Activism and American Constitutionalism: Some Notes and Reflections, in
NOMOS XX: CONSTrrUTIONALISM 333 (1978).
16. Berger's book was published in 1977. It should be compared with L. BoUDIN,
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1932), a much more scholarly discussion of the peren-
nial problem of the legitimacy of judicial review in a nation calling itself demo-
cratic.
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The meaning of these considerations for motivation inquiry is
quite clear: It is a futile quest. Motivation inquiry enables judges
to read their ideas of good social policy into the law with the pre-
tense that they are not really doing so. This point deserves
greater exposition.
In many respects, the study of law and the discussion of law in
legal texts and periodicals is a manifest failure. Perhaps that fail-
ure cannot be avoided, but surely it should be recognized. In es-
sence, the failure is this: Unlike the natural sciences, lawyers and
legal scholars do little building on the received learning of the
past. For a profession having adherence to precedent as one of its
main attributes, this situation is at least mildly amusing. The con-
sequence is that each generation of lawyers-each generation of
law students-must plow old ground and learn anew bits of an-
cient wisdom. These "new insights" are treated as something
novel when the contrary more likely is true.
For example, four score and one year ago Justice Holmes said:
I think that the judges themselves have failed adequately to recognize
their duty of weighing considerations of social advantage. The duty is in-
evitable, and the result of the often proclaimed judicial aversion to deal
with such considerations is simply to leave the very ground and founda-
tion of judgments inarticulate, and often unconscious .... 17
Thus "impact analysis"---at least, the name for it-is nothing new,
but it is not followed. Deans of prominent law schools have been
known to deride 'result-oriented" commentators on the judicial
process.
Similarly, all know (or should know, even though I am not
aware of any constitutional law casebook more than mildly so al-
luding) that the decisions of judges on economic and on social
questions depend, as Theodore Roosevelt said, on the judges' "ec-
onomic and social philosophy."18 Lawyers still pretend that judi-
cial decisions are brought by legal storks; some would have it that
such a posture is good for the hoi polloi, who presumably do not
have the moral and mental fiber to be told that judges are
human.19
17. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 467 (1897).
18. M. COHEN, AMERICAN THOuGfn A CamAL SKETCH 164 (1954).
19. E.g., Mishkin, The Supreme Court, 1964 Term-Foreword: The High Court,
The Great Writ and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARv. L. REV. 56, 62-70
(1965), criticized in Miller & Scheflin, The Power of the Supreme Court in the Age
of the Positive State: A Preliminary Excursus, 1967 DuES L.J. 273, 522.
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The meaning should be clear. Motivation inquiry, as Professor
Cushman stated, is a sometime thing, pulled out when a judge
wishes to justify a predetermined result. "Motivation" is a tech-
nique by which a judge can rationalize a decision-and little
more, and only when he wishes to do so. If he does not so desire,
and thus if he has reached a different conclusion, he will adhere
to Chief Justice Chase's position in Ex parte McCardle.2O
I do not mean to suggest that judicial decisions are capricious.
However, there can be no doubt that often, if not always, they are
the product of the preferences or predilections-the biases, if one
will--of the judges. At the appellate level, and perhaps elsewhere,
judges always have a choice between two competing principles of
roughly equal persuasiveness. Were that not so, one could not
justify paying lawyers to appeal lower court decisions. That
choice is based, as Justice White has said, less on pre-existing
rules of law than on a process of law creation.21 Is it not time for
the legal profession to confront that situation?
If it does, then members of the professoriate as well as law stu-
dents generally no longer would indulge themselves in taking the
written word of the Justices so seriously. Opinions, as Professors
Bickel and Wellington said some time ago, are often "desperately
negotiated documents";22 they are the product of a system of bar-
gaining routine in the Marble Palace. Of course, it is true that
much of what is known about the Supreme Court results from
what the Justices choose to declare in their opinions. I should like
to think that the profession has come to the time when it goes be-
yond the opinions and tries, systematically and thoroughly, to un-
derstand the Court. If it does so, then long expositions about
legislatures' motivations, licit or illicit, will be replaced by data
more relevant and more helpful. I do not expect many who read
this to agree with my views. Members of the bar are still prison-
ers of the past; the greatest barrier to progress is not the man in
the street, but the person with a vested interest in some system of
knowledge. Lawyers do not have much of a system of knowledge
about the law, but those with a vested interest in it likely will be
determined to continue the well-worn, albeit inadequate, ways.
Qu6 ldstima!
20. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
21. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 531 (1966) (White, J., dissenting). I agree
with Professor Forrester about the law-making proclivities of judges. See For-
rester, Are We Ready for Truth in Judging?, 63 A.BA'J. 1212 (1977).
22. Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: 27Te Lin-
coln Mills Case, 71 HAnv. L REv. 1, 3 (1957).
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